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"[Nleither harmonization of the insolvency laws of [Mexico,
Canada and the United States] nor adoption of a comprehensive
treaty concerning insolvency is likely to be achievable
in the near future."1
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent technological developments in the fields of communi-
cation, travel, and e-commerce have greatly increased the ability
of businesses to stretch their corporate structures, assets, and
transactions across a multitude of borders. In response, national
governments have increasingly sought to cooperate with other
governments on harmonizing the laws and regulations that gov-
ern cross-border transactions. On issues as diverse as taxes,
security, and the free movement of goods and labor, both multilat-
eral and bilateral treaties have become the preferred method of
cooperation between national governments.2 However, efforts to
utilize treaties in the field of international insolvency have signifi-
cantly lagged behind efforts seen in other fields and it remains a
field filled with divergent national laws and inefficient solutions
to cross-border insolvencies. This is problematic because "by its
very nature bankruptcy law must be symmetrical with the mar-
ket. If the market is becoming more global, bankruptcy law must
become global as well."' As the recent bankruptcy filings of
Enron, Global Crossing, and WorldCom demonstrate, there is no
doubt that cross-border insolvencies are becoming larger, more
global in scope, and, unfortunately, more frequent. Treaties pro-
vide companies with excellent guidelines and opportunities for
expanding their operations into foreign markets. Yet, when a
company does not achieve its anticipated success and is forced into
bankruptcy, there is no corresponding insolvency treaty to guide it
through the process of reorganization or dissolution.
While national governments have been slow to address this
1. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE: ALI INTERNATIONAL
LAW PUBLICATIONS, OVERVIEW OF THE TRANSNATIONAL INSOLVENCY PROJECT:
INTERNATIONAL STATEMENTS OF CANADIAN, MEXICAN AND UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY
LAW, at http://www.ali.org (last visited April 25, 2002) (identifying the quoted
language as one of the premises upon which their Transnational Insolvency Project
was based).
2. For an example of how the United States uses treaties to promote and protect
cross-border transactions, see the Agreement Between the United States of America
and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area,
Oct. 24, 2000, 2000 U.S.T. 160.
3. Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Global Development: The Transnational Insolvency
Project of the American Law Institute, 17 CONN. J. INT'L L. 99, 100 (2001).
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problem, practitioners and academics have taken the lead in advo-
cating change and proposing private sector solutions.' Although
notable as first steps in the drive for an effective overhaul of the
international insolvency system, their efforts still leave a tremen-
dous amount of work to be done. As one commentator aptly noted
in 1994, "[b]ankruptcy law has become so important to the
national economy that reform no longer can be left to a few aca-
demics and insolvency practitioners."5 Recent events have made
that statement all the more true, and national governments must
act swiftly to bring their bankruptcy laws back in symmetry with
the bankruptcy market. The most effective way to do this is
through the development of a comprehensive international insol-
vency treaty.6
Unfortunately, as the introductory quotation demonstrates,
many commentators believe that a treaty is an impractical or inef-
fective method for reforming the laws and procedures governing
cross-border insolvencies. This article refutes the introductory
quotation and argues that those who dismiss the ability of a treaty
to lead to the creation of harmonized insolvency laws and more
efficient resolutions of cross-border insolvencies are overlooking
the success treaties have had in other areas of the law, the cer-
tainty they will bring to the commercial market place, and the rel-
ative ease with which they can be implemented.7 While an
4. The legislators of the major trading countries have shown a distinct and
consistent disinclination to become involved on a country-to-country basis in
insolvency treaties or agreements. E. BRUCE LEONARD & CHRISTOPHER W. BESANT,
CURRENT ISSUES IN CROSS BORDER INSOLVENCY AND REOGANIZATIONS vii (1994). As
noted, however, the private sector has been much more active in the push for a more
cooperative approach to cross-border insolvencies. See, e.g., Evan D. Flaschen &
Ronald J. Silverman, Cross-Border Insolvency Cooperation Protocols, 33 TEX. INTL.
L.J. 587, 589 (1998) (stating that "[in the absence of a formal [international
insolvency] treaty, practitioners and courts have created what are essentially case-
specific, private international insolvency treaties.").
5. Douglass G. Boshkoff, Some Gloomy Thoughts Concerning Cross-Border
Insolvencies, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 931, 935 (1994).
6. The term international insolvency has been defined as "an insolvency which is
affected by the laws of two or more countries." CARL FELSENFELD, A TREATISE ON THE
LAW OF INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY 1-5 (2000) [hereinafter INSOLVENCY TREATISE];
Evan Flaschen & Leo Plank, The Foreign Representative: A New Approach to
Coordinating the Bankruptcy of a Multinational Enterprise, 10 AM. BANKR. INST. L.
REV. 111, 112 (2002). Throughout this article, "international insolvency" and "cross-
border insolvency" will be used interchangeably. For an example of the complex
factual pattern that can emerge from a cross-border insolvency, see In re Maxwell
Commun. Corp., 93 F.3d 1036, 1040 (2d Cir. 1996).
7. This article assumes that increased harmonization and cooperation is a proper
goal for all involved in the international insolvency practice. Others, however, may
argue that there is no need for harmonized legislation and that the current system
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insolvency treaty could be developed for an unlimited combination
of countries, this article will focus solely on the creation of a treaty
between the United States, Canada and Mexico.8 These three
countries are natural partners for an insolvency treaty given the
substantial volume of trade that occurs between them and their
proximity to each other. In addition, with the European Union
(EU) recently issuing a cross-border insolvency regulation for
their member states, now is the time for the countries of the North
Atlantic Free Trade Association 9 (NAFTA) to develop a common
works fine on its own - with each country determining on its own how to apply its
insolvency laws. It can be argued that corporations bring cross-border insolvencies
upon themselves by creating massive, complicated, multi-national corporate
structures that conduct trade across numerous borders. When companies choose to
do business in these foreign countries, whether through a subsidiary or through their
main corporate body, they open themselves up to the insolvency proceedings of the
host country. As the Supreme Court once noted,
[E]very person who deals with a foreign corporation impliedly
subjects himself to such laws of the foreign government ... as the
known and established policy of that government authorizes ....
He is conclusively presumed to have contracted with a view to such
laws of that government, because the corporation must of necessity
be controlled by them.
Canada S. Ry. Co. v. Gebhard, 109 U.S. 527, 537 (1883). There is no doubt that
companies utilize the host country's laws to the fullest extent possible when it is their
best interest - i.e., American companies utilizing the minimum wage laws of the host
country rather than the minimum wage laws of the United States. However, if that
same company has to file for bankruptcy, they will look towards the United States
bankruptcy law for protection due to its debtor-friendly provisions. Insolvency laws
and proceedings are varied across each country and it can be argued these differences
should be respected. This territorial approach has been succinctly described as "each
nation conduct[ing] its own insolvency proceeding with respect to the assets located
within its jurisdiction and disregard[ing] any parallel proceedings in a foreign
nation." SAMUEL BUFFORD & LOUISE DECARL ADLER ET AL., INT'L INSOLVENCY 3 (2001)
[hereinafter INT'L INSOLVENCY]. Despite the existence of this argument, as previously
stated, this article subscribes to the Universalist assumption that "without the
coordination of laws and courts of different jurisdictions in transnational cases, the
optimal use and distribution of assets cannot be accomplished, and waste and turmoil
are certain to result." Id. at 4.
8. There are several commentators that have called for the creation of a treaty
between the United States and Canada, yet fail to include Mexico. See Sean Dargan,
The Emergence of Mechanisms for Cross-Border Insolvencies in Canadian Law, 17
CONN. J. INT'L L. 107, 108 (2001) (proposing another look at a U.S.-Canada insolvency
treaty); Mike Perry, Lining-up at the Border: Renewing the Call for a Canada-U.S.
Insolvency Convention in the 21st Century, 10 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L 469, 494-98,
(2000) (outlining a preliminary model for a Canada-U.S. insolvency convention).
Given the importance of Mexico to both Canada and the United States, and the
increasing numbers of companies operating in all three of the countries, any
insolvency treaty the United States seeks to enter should include both Mexico and
Canada.
9. Mexico, Canada, and the United States signed the North American Free Trade
Agreement in 1992 in order to, among other things, "STRENGTHEN the special
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cross-border insolvency policy as well. After being implemented
among the NAFTA countries, the treaty could later be expanded
to include other countries, or could serve as a model for separate
treaties with other countries.
Part II of this article will briefly review the efforts already
underway to encourage harmonization and cooperation in interna-
tional insolvency law, and explain that while they are a good
starting point, national governments need to move beyond them.
In particular, this article will review and critique harmonization
efforts such as the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insol-
vency, the American Law Institute's Transnational Insolvency
Project, and the INSOL Lender's Group statement on interna-
tional insolvencies. Part III will examine the recent insolvency
regulation implemented by the EU and evaluate it as a model for
a treaty involving the NAFTA countries. Part IV will examine
other treaties that the United States has signed and discuss how
they can serve as a model for the development of an insolvency
treaty for the NAFTA countries-including the tax treaties in
existence between the United States and Canada, and the United
States and Mexico. In addition, it will discuss the lessons that can
be learned from the failed U.S.-Canada bankruptcy treaty from
the mid-1970s. Part V will review the post-NAFTA relationship
between the signatory countries and demonstrate how an insol-
vency treaty is a necessary and natural extension of the main
NAFTA treaty.
II. NON-TREATY TRENDS TOWARDS HARMONIZATION
As the introductory quote demonstrates, the majority of schol-
ars are of the opinion that an international insolvency treaty is
not likely to be achievable in the near future. People of this school
of thought believe, among other things, that countries are reluc-
tant to surrender their sovereignty over economic issues, the dif-
ferences found in national bankruptcy codes are insurmountable,
and past attempts at creating insolvency treaties have faired
bonds of friendship and cooperation among nations; CONTRIBUTE to the
harmonious development and expansion of world trade and provide a catalyst to
broader international cooperation; CREATE an expanded and secure market for the
goods and services produced in their territories ...." North American Free Trade
Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32 I.L.M. 298 [hereinafter NAFTA].
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poorly. ° Despite their views on the impracticality of a treaty,"
most commentators would agree that there is a trend underway
which focuses on increased cooperation and harmonization in the
field of international insolvency. This is demonstrated by the
increased level of cooperation between bankruptcy judges in cross-
border insolvencies, as well as with the recent development of
model insolvency codes and procedures by major private sector
groups." Notwithstanding this trend, substantial movement
towards harmonization and cooperation in the field of interna-
10. See, e.g., Faye Knowles, Insolvency in a Global Economy: Bring Me Your Tired,
Your Poor, Your Troubled Companies Yearning to Reorganize (Mar. 2001), at http:/!
www.fredlaw.com/articles/international/intl_0103_fk.html (last visited April 25,
2002) (analyzing methods for addressing cross-border insolvencies). Ms. Knowles
states that:
There are a number of ways countries could reach agreement on
how to handle multinational insolvency. Historically, the most
reliable is a multinational treaty or convention, but currently there
is no such treaty and limited attempts, notably in Europe, have
proved unworkable. Bilateral treaties could provide some answers,
but very few exist; they are difficult to achieve because of
governments' sovereignty and national interest concerns. (The
U.S., for example, has no such treaty with Canada and Mexico, its
NAFTA business partners.)
Id.
11. When talking about the probability of the creation of an insolvency treaty, the
author is referring solely to a treaty between the United States, Canada and Mexico.
However, the author fully supports, and expects, that the creation of a successful
treaty amongst the NAFTA countries would encourage the United States to enter into
additional insolvency treaties - both with individual countries and with groups such
as the European Union.
12. Cooperation seems to mean three things in the international insolvency arena.
First, it means that judges should respect decisions made in other countries, and
enforce them in their own country - a full faith and credit type argument. Second, it
means that courts should recognize and work with bankruptcy courts in other
countries that are handling simultaneous insolvency proceedings involving the same
company. This type of cooperation has received some attention here in the United
States. See, e.g., Maxwell Commun. Corp. v. Barclays Bank (In re Maxwell Commun.
Corp.), 170 B.R. 800, 803-06 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994) (utilizing foreign representatives
as a means of achieving a higher level of cross-border cooperation between
simultaneous insolvency proceedings). Third, it can also mean that there should be
one main proceeding, and that any ancillary proceedings in separate countries should
defer or transfer their action to that main proceeding. This option is the ultimate goal
in terms of fairness and ease for all parties involved. This was first noted as far back
as 1888 when one commentator stated:
It is obvious that, in the present state of commerce and of
communication, it would be better in nine cases out of ten that all
settlements of insolvent debtors with their creditors should be
made in a single proceeding, and generally at a single place; better
for the creditors, who would thus share alike, and better for the
debtor, because all his creditors would be equally bound by his
discharge.
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tional insolvency is still a distant goal, as "[i]nsolvency regimes
differ widely around the world, some can be described as highly
developed and sophisticated ... [yet] there are many jurisdictions
where the evolution of insolvency systems [are] much less
advanced "1.... 3 Thus, while the commentators are correct in
noting that this new atmosphere of cooperation will reduce some
of the problems encountered in cross-border insolvency proceed-
ings, they should not be satisfied with the developments to date.
Instead, by helping to foster an atmosphere of cooperation, these
new measures should be viewed as the natural first step towards
the creation of an insolvency treaty among the NAFTA countries.
It is now necessary to briefly review the efforts that have led to
this increased level of cooperation in the field of international
insolvency.
A. The UNCITRAL Model Law
In 1997, the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law (UNCITRAL) adopted a Model Law on Cross Border
Insolvency. 4 The stated goal of the Model Law is to:
[P]rovide effective mechanisms for dealing with cases of
cross-border insolvency so as to promote the objectives of:
(a) Cooperation .. .(b) Greater legal certainty ... (c) Fair
and efficient administration of cross-border insolvencies...
(d) Protection and maximization of the value of the debtor's
assets; and (e) Facilitation of the rescue of financially
troubled businesses, thereby protecting investment and
preserving employment. 5
The Model Law was not intended to create new substantive
laws for countries to implement; rather, it "provides a mechanism
for the smooth interdependent operation of various local laws,
courts, and court appointees.' 6 While intended to apply to all of a
country's insolvency proceedings, the Model Law allows countries
John Lowell, Conflict of Laws as Applied to Assignments for Creditors, 1 HARv. L.
REV. 259, 264 (1888).
13. Terry Bond, Global Development: A Global Approach for Multi-Creditor Out-
Of-Court Restructurings - A New Initiative and the Wider Issues, 17 CONN. J. INT'L L.
41, 41 (2001).
14. UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY WITH GUIDE TO
ENACTMENT, Annex (1997) [hereinafter MODEL LAW]. UNCITRAL is the "core legal
body within the United Nations system in the field of international trade law" and its
task is to "further the progressive harmonization and unification of the law of
international trade ... Id.
15. Id. at Pmbl.
16. Evan D. Flaschen, Anthony Smits & Leo Plank, Foreign Representatives in
2002] 127
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to exclude from its application "any types of entities, such as
banks or insurance companies, that are subject to a special insol-
vency regime in the [adopting state]."" The Model Law empha-
sizes that courts in separate insolvency proceedings should
communicate with one another, and provides guidelines and pro-
cedures for communication. It states that courts "shall cooperate
to the maximum extent possible with foreign courts or foreign rep-
resentatives ..... and that "[tihe court is entitled to communicate
directly with . . . foreign courts or foreign representatives.""
Therefore, the Model Law can be summarized as a sound series of
suggestions that countries can adopt to instruct their bankruptcy
courts on how they should work with foreign bankruptcy courts
and proceedings, yet it does little to address the substantive dif-
ferences in national insolvency laws and procedures. 9
While the drafters of the Model Law envision it as a signifi-
cant movement towards harmonization and cooperation, at this
time, only three developed countries have adopted the Model Law
into their national insolvency laws. In 2000, Mexico became the
first major economy to do so.2" Soon thereafter, the South African
government followed suit and adopted a very similar version of
the Model Law into their national insolvency law.2' Most recently,
Japan enacted international insolvency legislation based on the
Model Law that significantly redirected Japan's insolvency system
from an internal-looking approach to a multi-national, cooperative
approach.22 It remains unclear as to whether the adoption of the
Model Law by these countries will "provide an impetus to other
counties who are currently studying its adoption."23 The success-
ful implementation by those countries has not provided any impe-
U.S. Chapter 11 Cases: Filling the Void in the Law of Multinational Insolvencies, 17
CONN. J. INT'L L. 13, 18 (2001).
17. MODEL LAW, supra note 14, at Chapter I, art. 1 § 2.
18. Id. at Chap. IV, art. 25 §§ 1-2.
19. The Model Law, however, does contain some substantive elements. For
example, Chapter III, art. 20 § 1 provides, among other things, that "[ulpon
recognition of a foreign proceeding that is a foreign main proceeding, (a)
Commencement or continuation of individual actions or individual proceedings
concerning the debtor's assets . . . is stayed." Id. at Chap. III, art. 20 § 1.
20. INT'L INSOLVENCY INSTITUTE, 2000 CONFERENCE PAPER, INT'L INSOLVENCY IN
THE NEW MILLENNIUM: COORDINATING CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY CASES 12 (Bruce
Leonard ed., 2000) [hereinafter INT'L INSOLVENCY IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM].
21. Id. (noting that the South African law was slightly different because of a
provision which made it applicable only to "officially designated" countries).
22. E. Bruce Leonard, The International Year in Review, Am. BANKR. INST. J., Dec.
2001, at 34.
23. Id.
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tus to the United States government, as their efforts to implement
the Model Law have stalled.24 Given the importance of the United
States bankruptcy code to the field of international insolvency, its
adoption of the Model Code may provide the charge necessary to
trigger its large-scale adoption into national bankruptcy codes.
Yet, with the United States not close to adoption, and the major
economies in Europe now signed on to their own internal insol-
vency regulation, a widespread movement for adoption of the
Model Law seems unlikely.
In addition, while the Model Law does provide for increased
cooperation between countries, its drafters recognized that it is
subordinate to a treaty by stating that "[t]o the extent that this
Law conflicts with an obligation of this State arising out of any
treaty or other form of agreement to which it is a party with one or
more other States, the requirements of the treaty or agreement pre-
vail."25 This is a recognition that the Model Law can serve a use-
ful purpose in cases which involve two countries with little
interaction or economic ties, yet countries - for example, the
24. Despite the fact that the Model Law was passed by the UN in 1997, its
adoption by Congress has run into numerous obstacles and delays. See Shannon D.
Murray, As Cross-Border Bankruptcies Proliferate, So Does the Need to Coordinate
How Multiple Courts Will Adjudicate Them, THE DAILY DEAL, Oct. 24, 2001, at A3,
available at http://www.The Deal.com (last visited April 22, 2002) (reporting that
"The Model Law would become Chapter 15 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code if President
Bush signs it into law. That's not likely soon. The proposed Chapter 15 is imbedded
in bankruptcy reform legislation that has been mired in delays .... Congressional
interest in the bill . . . is also beginning to wane because of the sickly state of the
economy and other priorities."); see also Michael E. Foreman & Maryse S. Selit,
Proposal Enhances Protections to Foreign Debtors, N.Y. LAW JOURNAL, Aug. 26, 2002,
at 11 (reporting that "[a]n ongoing dispute over the rights of anti-abortion activists to
seek bankruptcy protection from judgments and fines imposed in connection with
their clinic protests has forced the House to postpone a final vote" on the bankruptcy
bill that would, among other things, adopt Chapter 15). Other countries said to be
contemplating the adoption of the Model Law include Australia, New Zealand, and
the United Kingdom. E. Bruce Leonard, The International Year in Review, Am.
BANKR. INST. J., Dec. 2000, at 24 [hereinafter Leonard, Year in Review, 2000]. While
Canada has not adopted the Model Law into their code, they did enact legislation
concerning solvent Canadian companies involved in U.S. Chapter 11 cases that was
inspired by the Model Law. INT'L INSOLVENCY, supra note 7, at 56.
Since Chapter 15 would become the dominant section of the Code for dealing with
cross-border insolvencies, this article will not review the current section relied on by
United States Bankruptcy courts in dealing with foreign proceedings and foreign
representatives, 11 U.S.C. § 304 (2000). See In re Allan Gee, 53 B.R. 891, 896 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1985) (stating that "a [§] 304 case is a limited one, designed to function in
aid of a proceeding pending in a foreign court") (citations omitted). For a more
thorough review of 11 U.S.C. § 304 and its use in cross-border insolvencies, see INT'L
INSOLVENCY, supra note 7, at 25-52.
25. MODEL LAw, supra note 14, at Chapter I, art. 3 (emphasis added).
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NAFTA countries - that are engaged in a more symbiotic rela-
tionship would establish their own insolvency treaty. In addition,
the Model Law contains an article entitled "Public Policy Excep-
tion," which states that nothing "prevents the court from refusing
to take an action governed by this Law if the action would be man-
ifestly contrary to the public policy of this State."26 While "mani-
festly contrary to ... public policy" seems like a tough standard to
meet, it remains unclear how often and to what extent courts
would utilize this escape hatch to retain control of a case or fail to
abide by the terms of the Model Law. Lastly, while the Model Law
contains provisions for recognizing foreign proceedings and repre-
sentatives, it lacks a formal reciprocity agreement. If Mexican
courts decide to recognize insolvency proceedings in Japan, there
is no guarantee that the Japanese bankruptcy courts will show
the same respect in a later case. This makes the Model Law a
very weak option when compared to an insolvency treaty that
mandates reciprocity between the courts and establishes firm poli-
cies and procedures for the courts to follow.
B. The American Law Institute
Another key factor in the move towards cooperation has been
the American Law Institute's (ALI's) Transnational Insolvency
Project (TIP), which was "unveiled" in May of 2000.27 The TIP con-
tains a review of the insolvency systems of Mexico, Canada, and
the United States; and, more importantly, a review of the Princi-
ples of Cooperation (The Principles), which are designed to "pro-
mote cooperation, reduce duplication, and diminish the issues in
controversy between the parties involved in cross-border insol-
vency cases."2" The Principles gain credence as a means for coop-
eration because of the circumstances underlying its creation. As
Professor Westbrook noted, the American Law Institute is a
highly regarded organization that has trained its sights on law
reform in other domestic areas in the past, and thus it carried
some significance that they ventured into the international insol-
26. Id. at art. 6. In fact, some commentators have questioned whether Chapter
15, as it is currently drafted, is too full of escape hatches to be an effective means for
moving bankruptcy courts towards a more Universalist approach to cross-border
insolvencies. See, e.g., Brian Devling, The Continuing Vitality of the Territorial
Approach to Cross-Border Insolvency, 70 UMKC L. REV. 435, 450-51 (2001).
27. Westbrook, supra note 3, at 99.
28. MARGARITA T.B. COALE, BANKRUPTCY BULLETIN: RECENT ADVANCES IN COURT-
To-CouRT COMMUNICATIONS IN CROss-BORDER CASES, Feb. 2002, available at http:l
www.weil.com. (last visited April 15, 2002).
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vency arena with the TIP.29 The actual working group that
drafted the TIP was comprised of distinguished bankruptcy prac-
titioners, judges, and scholars from Canada, Mexico, and the
United States." However the TIP was undertaken without the
official support of the governments of Mexico, Canada, or the
United States, and thus represents a belief of its drafters that "a
private-sector initiative might be more fruitful as a next step
within the NAFTA."31
The TIP is very similar to the Model Code in what it does and
does not accomplish.3 2 The TIP's central feature is the creation of
The Principles, which recognize that "one of the most essential
elements of co-operation in cross-border cases is communication
among the administrating authorities of the countries involved."33
However, while encouraging cross-border communications, the
TIP also acknowledges that The Principles do not supplant "local
procedures and local ethical requirements," nor do they "consti-
tute a substantive determination of any matter in controversy
before the Court."34 Unlike the Model Law, which national gov-
ernments adopt into their insolvency laws, The Principles are
designed to be adopted by the bankruptcy courts themselves, "fol-
lowing notice to the parties and counsel as would be given under
local procedures .. . ,,31 This provides The Principles with more
29. Westbrook, supra note 3, at 99. According to a statement on their home page,
the ALI was formed to "promote the clarification and simplification of the law and
better its adaptation to social needs [and] to secure the better administration of
justice." The American Law Institute, at http://www.ali.org (last visited April 28,
2002).
30. Westbrook, supra note 3, at 99.
31. Id. at 101. This is a common theme with many of the commentators that have
previously written about this subject. See, e.g., INT'L INSOLVENCY IN THE NEW
MILLENNIUM, supra note 20, at 23 (stating that "[riecent experience with
international workouts and insolvencies shows, however, that the courts and the
insolvency community can achieve considerable progress without the need for
legislative action.").
32. The similarities in the goals and recommendations of UNCITRAL and the ALI
can be explained in part by the fact that they were staffed by many of the same
people. For example, one widely cited commentator in the field of international
insolvency, Jay Lawrence Westbrook, was the United States Reporter for the
American Law Institute's TIP, as well as a co-leader of the United States delegation
to the UNCITRAL Conference on International Insolvency. Jay Lawrence Westbrook,
Creating International Insolvency Law, 70 AM. BANKR. L.J. 563, 563 (2000).
33. INT'L INSOLVENCY IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM, supra note 20, at 18.
34. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, TRANSNATIONAL INSOLVENCY PROJECT: PRINCIPLES
OF COOPERATION IN INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY CASES AMONG MEMBERS OF THE
NORTH ATLANTIC FREE TRADE ASSOCIATION 17 (Tentative Draft 2000).
35. INT'L INSOLVENCY IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM, supra note 20, at 19. According to
the International Insolvency Institute web site, there have been nineteen protocols
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flexibility, as they can be adopted and utilized in the manner
called for by any given case. 6 While that flexibility can be a posi-
tive feature in some situations, it does little to provide companies
with firm guidance for planning and engaging in cross-border
transactions - as the firm guidelines of a treaty would do.
In addition to its comments on cooperation and communica-
tion between courts in cross-border cases, the TIP is also very
important in that is presents a thorough and accurate comparison
of the bankruptcy laws and practices in Mexico, Canada and the
United States. 7 These statements will be very helpful to interna-
tional insolvency practitioners in the future, and considering that
they were the product of a five-year effort by a distinguished
group of drafters, they should be more accurate than previous
sources of information. Additionally, the statements provide an
opportunity to substantiate the differences that would need to be
addressed in the creation of a NAFTA insolvency treaty.
C. INSOL Lender's Group
A third important actor in the movement towards cooperation
and harmonization is the INSOL Lender's Group, a professional
organization comprised of insolvency practitioners; including
legal, accounting, and lending professionals." Their statement of
principles calling for more cooperation in the lending process is
unique in that it focuses on getting creditors to work together dur-
ing large cross-border insolvency cases. For example, the fourth
principle of their statement asserts that "itihe interests of rele-
vant creditors are best served by co-ordinating their response to a
debtor in financial difficulty."39 These principles are highly volun-
tary though, and are not designed for adoption by the bankruptcy
issued between United States and Canadian bankruptcy courts. INTERNATIONAL
INSOLVENCY INSTITUTE, CROss-BORDER INSOLVENCY ORDERS AND PROTOCOLS, available
at http://www.iiiglobal.org/international/protocols.htm (last visited April 24, 2002).
36. INT'L INSOLVENCY IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM, supra note 20, at 12.
37. Thomas M. Gaa & Paula E. Garzon, International Creditors' Rights and
Bankruptcy, 31 INT'L LAWYER 273, 283 (1997) ("However, although the statements of
the domestic laws of all three NAFTA countries are intended to be used by lawyers
and businesspersons from other countries, they do not presuppose 'familiarity with
the basic domestic corpus juris and with the political and cultural presuppositions on
which each country's laws and procedures rest."'); see also Geoffrey C. Hazard Jr.,
Foreword to AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, TRANSNATIONAL INSOLVENCY PROJECT, INT'L
STATEMENT OF U.S. BANKR. LAW (Tentative Draft 1997).
38. INT'L INSOLVENCY IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM, supra note 20, at 13.
39. INSOL Lender's Group Statement of Principles for a Global Approach to
Multicreditor Workouts, U.N. Comm'n on Int'l Trade Law 8, 10 (2000).
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courts or the legislatures of the NAFTA countries. Since the
United States has many measures designed to help debtors reor-
ganize and work with creditors, one could imagine a situation
where the Mexican creditors, for one reason or another, proceed
against the debtors assets, while the creditors in the United
States are constrained by an automatic stay. Since the INSOL
statement is a voluntary agreement, there is nothing preventing
the Mexican creditors from proceeding as if there was a treaty in
place with a common automatic stay provision. Despite these
problems, the INSOL principles deserve recognition for contribut-
ing to the increased level of cooperation now found in cross-border
insolvency proceedings by getting creditors more involved in the
cooperative atmosphere. In the future, creditors can be a driving
force behind the creation of an insolvency treaty, as creditors do
not like to see creditors in another country receive better treat-
ment - i.e., collection of their assets - just because they are sta-
tioned in another country. An insolvency treaty can serve to make
all creditors similarly situated, and reduce the rush for judgment
often found in current cross-border insolvencies.
D. Problems Inherent in the Current Modes of
Cooperation
The more bankruptcy courts communicate and cooperate with
bankruptcy courts in other countries, the more debtors and credi-
tors in cross-border insolvencies stand to benefit. While the meth-
ods described above certainly will push the international
insolvency field towards a more cooperative and congenial atmos-
phere, there remain many problems that will limit their impact.
Though some of these problems have been addressed within the
text already, they will be more fully developed in this section.
From a problematic standpoint, the first thing that should be
examined is the lack of firm, binding substantive principles in all
of the efforts previously addressed. Those efforts are only guiding
principles, primarily focused on increasing cooperation and com-
munication among the various parties and court systems. The
efforts do nothing to address the substantive differences in the
laws of the NAFTA countries, nor do they provide a firm guideline
for companies to follow when planning and executing cross-border
transactions. As the amount of trade and activity amongst the
NAFTA countries continues to increase, companies will face an
increasing amount of cross-border insolvency situations, with both
their assets and their creditors spread throughout more than one
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of the countries. In cross-border insolvencies, the more defined
cross-border insolvency laws and procedures are, the better off
debtors and creditors are going to be. The Model Law and the TIP
both leave too much discretion in the hands of judges, and fail to
provide enough predictability for the business community. Volun-
tary creditor agreements, while creative and admirable, lack the
authority and binding nature to make them effective; especially in
cross-border insolvency situations. Companies and creditors will
be better served by substantive measures codified in a treaty.
A second problem with these efforts is that, even if they are
adopted by the legislatures (as with the Model Law), the courts (as
with the TIP) or the creditors themselves (as with INSOL), they
contain too many escape hatches to make them effective. As
already mentioned, even if the Model Law is adopted into a coun-
try's bankruptcy code, courts can opt out of its provisions during a
case through the public policy exception.40 In addition the adopt-
ing country is free to modify the Model Law as they see fit before
they adopt it. Taken to its extreme, this could lead us to the exact
situation we are in now - each country adopting the Model Law in
a different form, thus preventing the goal of harmonization. This
can be seen with the case of South Africa, which made a substan-
tial change in the Model Law by declaring that the legislation was
applicable only to "officially designated" countries.41 Getting a for-
eign country so designated, or getting their designation revoked,
is "not as routine as it may appear because both types of notices
[of designation] must be approved by the South African Parlia-
ment before they become official."42 In effect, by not making the
Model Law automatically applicable to all cross-border insolvency
proceedings, the South African parliament retained its ability to
negotiate individual designation treaties or agreements with
other countries. There is some evidence that this clause was
inserted to combat the lack of reciprocity in the Model Law and to
guarantee that South African companies operating in foreign
countries would be extended the same protections as foreign com-
panies and representatives would be extended in South Africa.43
40. See discussion supra Part II A.
41. INT'L INSOLVENCY IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM, supra note 20, at 12.
42. Id.
43. BASIL COUTSOUDIS, UNCITRAL, UNICITRAL INSTRUMENTS IN SOUTH AFRICA 1
(1999), at http://www.law-online.co.za/IntTradeLaw/UNCITRAL%2OInstruments.htm
(last visited May 4, 2002) (describing the legal instruments discussed at a
UNCITRAL conference held at Rand Afrikaans University in May of 1999). Mr.
Coutsoudis noted that:
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This is just one example of how, with the implementation of the
Model Law, countries can bypass the cooperative intent of the
drafters and adjust the scope of the laws in a manner more closely
aligned with their own national insolvency laws and interests.
A third problem is to whom each of the efforts is addressed.
The Model Law is addressed to the legislatures of any and all
countries. Thus, the provisions contained within are aimed at
insolvency proceedings involving any country in the world. While
this may make the provisions ideal for application in insolvencies
involving two countries that have limited interaction, they are not
practical for situations involving countries that do a great deal of
business with each other; for example, the NAFTA countries. This
is evidenced by the European Union's recent adoption of their own
regulation to cover inter-union cross-border insolvencies, rather
than leaving it up to the individual member states to enact the
Model Law.44 As Professor Westbrook stated, "although the Model
Law represents an important first step in international coopera-
tion, it is necessarily limited in its scope by its global intentions."45
While the Model Law is aimed too broadly, the TIP suffers from
the opposite problem - it is aimed at too narrow a target. The TIP
correctly identifies that the NAFTA countries, due to their
increasing dependence on and trade with one another, are in a
position to establish a more cooperative approach for addressing
cross-border insolvencies. However, by focusing on a private-sec-
tor initiative and depending on courts for implementation of the
guidelines, the TIP cuts out the legislatures of the NAFTA coun-
tries. The INSOL principles suffer from being overbroad, in that
Both the committee of the Society of Advocates of Natal, and the
Society of Advocates of South Africa (Witwatersrand Division) have
expressed concern . . . that [the Model Law] does not provide for
reciprocity prior to requiring a mandatory recognition of foreign
insolvency proceedings .... This is clearly a valid concern, which
needs to be urgently addressed prior to the adoption of the Model
Law. It is suggested that a degree of reciprocity be required, prior
to compelling South African Courts to recognise foreign
proceedings.
Id. at 4. These concerns would seem to have been addressed by the manner in which
the South African parliament enacted the Model Law - requiring separate agreements
with "officially designated" countries. At this time, the author was unable to
determine whether or not the United States has become an "officially designated"
country with respect to the application of South Africa's insolvency laws. For an in-
depth review of how the Model Law will impact South Africa, see Alastir Smith &
Andre Boraine, Crossing Borders into South African Insolvency Law: From the Roman
Dutch Jurists to the UNCITRAL Model Law, 10 Am. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 135 (2002).
44. See discussion infra Part III.
45. Westbrook, supra note 3, at 100.
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they are aimed at situations all around the world, and from being
too narrow, in that they are aimed only at creditors. Com-
pounding these problems is the fact that the INSOL principles do
not require adoption by any governmental agency, the legislature
(as with the Model Law), or the courts (as with TIP). They are
completely devoid of any legal form and thus are completely unre-
liable from both the debtor and creditor perspective.
Another problem arises when we view international insol-
vency principles from a policy standpoint. Who should be leading
the charge towards harmonized laws and procedures - the private
sector or the United States government? Past governmental
efforts at harmonization and cooperation have admittedly been
poor, as "[b]ankruptcy has traditionally been among the most
parochial of legal fields, with each country grabbing and distribut-
ing assets within its grasp with little attention to foreign courts
and foreign laws."46 In the past few years, however, we have seen
the number and the sheer size (monetarily speaking) of cross-bor-
der insolvencies rise at a tremendous rate. As these numbers con-
tinue to climb, governments are going to be forced to turn their
attention towards this area and make tough decisions about how
they want their insolvency laws to interact with the insolvency
laws of other countries. In the Singer Corporation's recent insol-
vency case, had the foreign creditors not cooperated in the manner
that they did, and had instead forced the liquidation of the com-
pany and its assets, this might have provoked a hostile reaction
from Congress. 47 As one commentator aptly stated, "[b]ankruptcy
law has become so important to the national economy that reform
no longer can be left to a few academics and insolvency practition-
ers."48 Nor can the United States government sit by and watch as
46. Id. at 99.
47. See Flaschen, supra note 16, at 15 (detailing how a "global meltdown" of
Singer at the hands of creditors all around the world was able to be avoided). While
in the Singer case the spirit of cooperation triumphed, there is no reason to believe
that the same result can be achieved in future cross-border insolvencies. With a
treaty in place, many of the problems faced in the Singer case could have been
avoided, and a "global meltdown" would have been less of a worry. However, as with
the Singer case, there may be assets and creditors in countries other than the United
States, Mexico and Canada, and thus outside any insolvency treaty between those
countries. In that situation, under the insolvency regime proposed by this article,
courts would utilize the provisions of the NAFTA insolvency treaty first, and then
utilize the Model Law and other cooperation procedures in their interaction with
other countries. In this role, the Model Law serves as a secondary measure, from
which to fill in any gaps from the NAFTA treaty, and in dealing with non-signatory
countries.
48. Boshkoff, supra note 5, at 935.
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other countries negotiate and ratify their own insolvency treaties
and agreements; as the EU recently did. Each new agreement
signed without the participation of the United States government,
whether they are directly binding on the United States or will
bring their effects to our shores indirectly through American com-
panies operating overseas, will establish new rules and policies
without taking into account American interests. While neither
minimizing the accomplishments of groups such as the ALI and
UNCITRAL, nor the importance of the private sector in helping to
push governments into action, the growing import and frequency
of cross-border insolvencies calls for substantial government inter-
vention in the form of a treaty.
Fortunately, other countries have recognized the need for
reform, and their actions can provide important examples to the
United States as it moves toward the enactment of an interna-
tional insolvency treaty. The next part of this article will examine
how the EU has acted to harmonize their cross-border insolvency
laws and procedures.
III. THE EUROPEAN UNION'S APPROACH To INSOLVENCY
In May of 2000, the European Union passed an insolvency
regulation in order to ensure the effective and efficient operation
of their internal market.49 Similar to the argument for govern-
ment intervention made in the previous section, the EU believed
that insolvencies were having "more and more cross-border
effects" and therefore there was "a need for a Community act
requiring coordination of the measures to be taken regarding an
insolvent debtor's assets." ° Furthermore, the EU was of the opin-
ion that the objectives behind this regulation "cannot be achieved
to a sufficient degree at [the] national level ....""
It is important to first note the form in which the EU acted.
By placing the insolvency guidelines in a regulation, as opposed to
49. EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No. 1346/2000 OF 29 MAY
2000 ON INSOLVENCY PROCEEDINGS, pmbl., para. 2, at http://europa.eu.int/en/
index.html (last viewed April 20, 2002) [hereinafter COUNCIL REGULATION]. This
regulation represents a long-time effort by the European countries to come to an
agreement on insolvency proceedings and policies. Previous attempts included the
1982 European Community Draft Bankruptcy Convention, the 1990 Council of
Europe Convention on Certain International Aspects of Bankruptcy, and the 1995
European Union Convention on Insolvency Proceedings. Colloquim, Harmonization
of Int'l Bankr. Law: A U.S. Perspective, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2543, 2555 (1996).
50. COUNCIL REGULATION, supra note 49, at para. 3.
51. Id. at para. 4.
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a directive, the EU ensured that they would take direct effect in
the member states, thereby eliminating the need for domestic-
enabling legislation.52 In addition, this regulation replaces many
pieces of domestic legislation and treaties that the member states
had in force already; including the Nordic Convention as it relates
to Finland and Sweden, and nine other bilateral conventions that
were in place between various member states.53 This unique
supranational application of law onto the insolvency laws of sover-
eign nations can serve as a model for a treaty between the NAFTA
countries. This is true despite the fact that while NAFTA and the
EU were both created out of treaties signed by their member
states, the NAFTA treaty did not create a supranational gov-
erning body like the EU treaty. Therefore, any further insolvency
treaty would have to be created by the governments of the NAFTA
countries and either be added to the original treaty, or be con-
tained in a separate treaty.54
The new EU regulation could be a subject for a separate arti-
cle, and this paper will address only some of its most important
aspects. The most important aspect of the EU regulation is how it
addresses the question of jurisdiction for insolvency proceedings
in separate countries. Under the regulation, the insolvency pro-
ceedings shall be opened in the "courts of the Member State
within the territory of which the centre of a debtor's main inter-
ests is situated ... Any subsequent insolvency proceedings
that are opened in another member state will be "restricted to the
assets situated in [that member state]" and will be considered
52. Leonard, Year in Review, 2000, supra note 24, at 24. For an explanation of the
differences between regulations, directives, and other types of legislative action the
EU can take, see EUROPEAN UNION, THE ABC OF COMMUNITY LAW, THE COMMUNITY'S
RANGE OF TOOLS, at http://www.europa.eu.intleur-lex/en/about/abc/abc_20.html (last
visited May 4, 2002).
53. INT'L INSOLVENCY, supra note 7, at 77; COUNCIL REGULATION, supra note 49, at
art. 44.
54. For a thorough review of the structural differences between NAFTA and the
EU, see James M. Boyers, Globalization and the United States Constitution: How
Much Can it Accommodate, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 583, 588-99 (1998)
(distinguishing NAFTA from the European Union).
55. COUNCIL REGULATION, supra note 49, at art. 2-3, para. 1. The "centre of main
interests" is presumed to be the place of the registered office in the absence of proof to
the contrary. Id. There is uncertainty about how courts will define and apply this
term, so it remains to be seen if it will have a broader scope that was intended. See
FRESHFIELDS BRUCKHAUS DERINGER, THE EU REGULATION ON INSOLVENCY
PROCEEDINGS 6, Dec. 2000, [hereinafter EU REGULATION] available at http:ll
www.freshfields.com/practice/finance/publication/pdfs/2845.pdf (last visited April 20,
2002) (speculating on reaction to the insolvency regulation).
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"secondary proceedings." 6 This seems to serve two purposes:
first, to protect the interests of the creditors situated in that state,
and second, to assist the main proceeding in circumstances where
the debtor's estate is too complex or diverse to administer as a
whole. 7 The main proceeding is not without any control over the
secondary proceeding though, as the court handling the secondary
proceeding "shall" grant a stay to the liquidator from the main
proceeding if so requested, unless the secondary proceeding is
"manifestly of no interest to the creditors in the main
proceedings."58
Choice of law is another area that is important, as the laws of
the member state where the main proceeding is situated will,
except where the regulation provides otherwise, apply to all proce-
dural and substantive matters. 9 Clearly, the insolvency laws of
the EU member states contain differences similar to those that
exist between the insolvency laws of the NAFTA countries.'
Instead of trying to come to a consensus and develop a common set
of laws, the EU chose to remain more focused on the procedural
aspects and the facilitation of insolvency cases. This approach
could provide an appropriate model for a NAFTA treaty to those
parties that worry about American companies being subjected to
the insolvency laws of another treaty member. Under the "centre
of main interests" approach taken by the EU regulation, compa-
nies that were incorporated and based in the United States would
continue to apply for bankruptcy in the U.S. system and be sub-
jected to the decisions of U.S. courts. While some assets in other
countries would be subject to secondary proceedings, these pro-
ceedings could be stayed through a system as described above, and
thus they would not lose total control of them as well. To create
harmonized law is an admittedly difficult task, and so the EU
approach offers a clear model for a NAFTA treaty that would cre-
ate set, fixed policies and procedures, yet leave room for the differ-
ences in the substantive law of the three countries. It would offer
debtors and creditors a clear understanding on how the bank-
ruptcy courts of one of the NAFTA countries would view proceed-
56. COUNCIL REGULATION, supra note 49, at art. 3, para. 2-3.
57. EU REGULATION, supra note 55, at 7.
58. COUNCIL REGULATION. supra note 49, at art. 33, para. 1.
59. Id. at art 4; EU REGULATION, supra note 55, at 7.
60. For example, "[tihe French put great emphasis on protecting the rights of the
workforce, and trying to save their jobs. [Whereas Germany maintains] deeply
entrenched preferential rights which make almost all cases completely academic for
the ordinary trade creditor." Boshkoff, supra note 5, at 936.
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ings in the other countries, how those proceedings would relate to
one another, and what law would be applied to all of their assets.
More importantly, unlike the Model Law, the EU approach
ensures that there will be reciprocity among the courts of the
member states, thus reducing the types of concerns seen in the
adoption of a modified Model Law by the South African
parliament.
This regulation, with its definitive cross-border insolvency
rules and procedures, entered into force on May 31, 2002.61 Seeing
how it is viewed is a "major step forward in international insol-
vency cooperation," how European courts and companies react to
it will be "watched with great interest by insolvency professionals
and those involved in the international credit area."62
IV. OTHER TREATIES THE UNITED STATES HAS ENTERED
INTO AND THE PRECEDENT THEY CAN PROVIDE FOR AN
INSOLVENCY TREATY
Since the very origins of the United States, the government
has used treaties in a wide variety of legal areas, including the
social, criminal and commercial contexts .6  Likewise, within the
dealings of the United States with Mexico and Canada, there are
numerous examples of successful implementation of treaties. For
purposes of this paper, I will be drawing on the experience of a
limited number of treaties, including the failed U.S.-Canada insol-
vency treaty, and the tax treaties between the United States and
Canada and the United States and Mexico.
A. General Information on Treaties
There has always been a love-hate relationship between the
United States and treaties. On one hand, there is a movement
that pushes for international treaties as a means of solidifying our
relationships with foreign countries, establishing set laws and pol-
icies, and opening up more markets for American products. On the
other hand, the United States has always been fiercely indepen-
61. INT'L INSOLVENCY, supra note 7, at 75.
62. Leonard, Year in Review, 2000, supra note 24, at 24.
63. See, e.g., Agreement Between the United States of America and Canada
Regarding Mutual Assistance and Co-operation Between Their Customs
Administrations, June 20, 1984, U.S.-Can., 1984 U.S.T. LEXIS 109; Extradition
Treaty Between the Gov. of the United States and the Gov. of Belize, Mar. 30, 2000,
U.S.-Belize, 2000 U.S.T. LEXIS 59; Agreement Between the United States of America
and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area,
Oct. 24, 2000, 2000 U.S.T. LEXIS 160.
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dent, and many groups consistently worry about the United States
losing its sovereignty through treaties and other international
agreements. This can put us at odds with the rest of the world, as
evidenced by our recent failure to ratify the Rome treaty that cre-
ated the world's first permanent war crimes tribunal. s4 Although
then-President Clinton originally signed the treaty, the United
States Congress has refused to ratify it because of fears that "its
citizens would be subject to frivolous or politically motivated pros-
ecutions."65 There is evidence that the United States is slipping
behind other countries in the negotiation of free trade agreements
as well.6" Therefore, in the negotiation and drafting of an insol-
vency treaty between the NAFTA countries, these types of fears
must be kept in mind and addressed in order to ensure ratifica-
tion. Unlike the Rome treaty, an insolvency treaty would not deal
with issues of national security and prosecution of public and mili-
tary authorities - things that rate very high on the government's
list of sovereign rights. An insolvency treaty is a commercial
treaty, and thus it may receive less scrutiny from Congress. In
64. New Era in War Crimes Justice, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2002, at A12. See also,
Barbara Crossette, Washington is Criticized for Growing Reluctance to Sign Treaties,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2002, at A5 (highlighting the problems being created in the rest of
the world by the current administration's reluctance to sign treaties).
65. New Era in War Crimes Justice, supra note 64, at A12. Just recently, the
Bush administration "unsigned" the Rome treaty, effectively removing President
Clinton's signature from the treaty and stated that the "new International Criminal
court should expect no cooperation from the Unites States ... ." Neil A. Lewis, U.S.
Rejects All Support For New Court on Atrocities, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2002, at All.
This administration has also recently rejected American ratification of the Kyoto
Protocol, which dealt with environmental policies and the reduction of greenhouse
gases. Andrew C. Revkin, Bush Offers Plan for Voluntary Measures to Limit Gas
Emissions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2002, at A6. Given these recent moves, the creation
of a cross-border insolvency treaty could face opposition from this administration. It
must also be noted, however, that unlike the International Criminal Court, the
purposes of an insolvency treaty are to protect American interests abroad, and not
extend jurisdiction over them to a supranational body. American companies are
already operating all over the world, and especially within Canada and Mexico.
Without a treaty in place, insolvent American companies are at risk of detrimental
treatment from foreign court systems and creditors. Therefore, a treaty would help to
protect American interests in foreign court proceedings that they are already exposed
to, and not create any new risks - hopefully reducing this administration's anti-treaty
feelings.
66. See Robert B. Zoellick, Falling Behind on Free Trade, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14,
2002, at Sec. 4, pg. 13 (stating that there are 150 regional free-trade and customs
agreements, and the United States is party to only three of them). Mr. Zoellick, the
United States Trade Representative in the George W. Bush administration, further
noted that the EU has twenty-nine free trade agreements, and is negotiating with
twelve more countries, while Mexico recently negotiated nine free trade agreements
with twenty-nine countries. Id.
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addition, an insolvency treaty may draw less opposition due to the
preeminence of U.S. bankruptcy law in the field of international
insolvency.67 Many companies, both domestic and foreign, regu-
larly seek the protection of U.S. law due to its debtor friendly pro-
visions, advanced procedures and provisions, and the familiarity
of U.S. bankruptcy courts with large cross-border insolvency
cases. As one commentator stated:
An emerging trend is for a multinational group of compa-
nies to file in a U.S. bankruptcy court and request that the
U.S. court exercise its jurisdiction over all of the affiliated
debtor's assets and creditors, regardless of location .... [A]
successful filing here has huge potential rewards because
U.S. bankruptcy laws offer broad opportunity for
reorganization."8
Thus, there is a good chance that the United States may be
successful in negotiating an insolvency treaty with terms that are
very favorable to American interests, represent the codification of
portions of U.S. bankruptcy law, and attract little opposition from
members of Congress or the current administration.
B. The Failed U.S. and Canada Insolvency Treaty
While the previous section detailed some general issues sur-
rounding treaties, an analysis of the efforts of the United States in
past treaties can also prove beneficial. One specific instance,
which is perfectly on point for a modern insolvency treaty, is the
previous effort of the United States and Canada to develop an
insolvency treaty. Started in 1973, the efforts of U.S. and Cana-
dian representatives to come to an agreement on an insolvency
treaty were ultimately halted in 1982 at the request of Canada,
67. See DR. CHRISTOPH G. PAULUS, Some Thoughts on an Insolvency Procedure for
Countries, Part B.I at http://iiiglobal.org/international/resources.html (stating that
"[tihe ideal of a 'fresh start' which is obvious in the USA... is also being adopted in
other countries and [this] is reflected linguistically by the application of the word
'insolvency' instead of 'bankruptcy'. . . . This implies a change in values because
insolvency . . . is considered a part of the economic ups and downs and is treated
accordingly.").
68. Knowles, supra note 10, at 2. As Ms. Knowles points out, cases such as these
raise "issues of how a U.S. court can tell creditors and courts in other countries what
they can and cannot do with assets and claims in those other countries - and for these
reasons such a case filed here might be dismissed." Id. (emphasis in original). The
simple answer to Ms. Knowles' question is a treaty - as this would provide courts with
specific instructions to follow when addressing proceedings in other countries. If they
were in a country with which the United States did not have a treaty, then the courts
and the parties could fall back on cooperation measures such as the Model Law or the
TIP.
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and never resumed by either party.6 9 There are various rationales
for why these attempts at a treaty ultimately failed. Some sug-
gest that the treaty failed because "it was politically unpopular
[due to] its underlying and basic concept: 'there shall be a single
administration of the estate of the debtor."'70 Others view its fail-
ure as rooted in the differences that existed between U.S. and
Canadian bankruptcy laws at the time, and the domestic effort
Canada was then undertaking to reform and update their bank-
ruptcy laws.71 In addition, this view believes that when Canada's
reforms were finished, the actors who had been concerned with
the bilateral treaty in the past had already shifted their attention
to universal efforts such as the UNCITRAL Model Law.72 One of
the participants in the treaty negotiations even "opined that the
major cause of the failure of the negotiation was the opposition of
the United States Internal Revenue Service over a perceived loss
of priority in bankruptcy as a result of the draft treaty."73
Whatever the reason for failure was, it is important to review the
terms of that proposed treaty and to determine if in this new coop-
erative climate, they could be included in a modern treaty.
As previously mentioned, the treaty sought to create a system
in which there would be a "single administration of the estate of
the debtor." This runs contrary to both the modern trend of coop-
eration between simultaneous insolvency proceedings, and the
recognition of the EU that secondary insolvency proceedings can
even prove helpful in large, complicated cross-border insolven-
cies.75 The consolidation of a majority of the decision making abil-
ity into one main proceeding can be a good idea when considered
from an efficiency prospective, as well as when considering the
interests of the debtor and creditors. Recent cases, however, have
demonstrated that bankruptcy courts in different countries can
work together, and thus it is not necessary for a treaty to force all
activity into one proceeding. In addition, allowing the limited par-
ticipation of ancillary proceedings, as in the EU regulation, can
serve to reduce fears among corporations and Congress that the
69. INSOLVENCY TREATISE, supra note 6, at 3-8.
70. Dargan, supra note 8, at 116.
71. INSOLVENCY TREATISE, supra note 6, at 3-9.
72. Id.
73. Id. (recording a conversation with Professor Nadelmann, one of the
participants in the treaty negotiations).
74. See discussion supra Part III.
75. COUNCIL REGULATION, supra note 49, at art. 1, para. 1 (stating that the
purposes of a secondary proceeding is "to assist the main proceeding in circumstances
where the debtor's estate is too complex or diverse to administer as a whole.").
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U.S. bankruptcy courts may have no involvement in insolvency
proceedings with American interests. For these reasons, it is clear
that the proposed treaty went too far in limiting all decision mak-
ing to a single main proceeding, and that this aspect should not be
carried forward into a modern treaty. A system that divides
responsibility between a main proceeding and limited ancillary
proceedings, with firm guidelines in place to facilitate the interac-
tion of the multiple proceedings, would be the more desirable
approach.
Instead of creating harmonized substantive law, the proposed
treaty "provid[ed] for a choice of law which in general, will govern
all proceedings. 7 6 The proposed treaty applied a two-part system
for determining where the proceeding would be based and which
law would apply. The treaty stated that:
[JIurisdiction . . . is given to the State that has located
within its territory 'the greater portion on the value of the
property of the debtor.' The Courts of that State will apply
its laws to the proceedings and administer the estate. The
trustee appointed in the State having jurisdiction will be
able to Exercise his powers in both States."
Given the conclusion of the previous discussion - that estab-
lishing a single proceeding is unnecessary - the jurisdictional ele-
ment of the new treaty will be slightly less important and can be
more flexible. As with any cross-border situation, however, there
will have to be some method for establishing where the main pro-
ceeding should take place. Rather than having a first-to-file sys-
tem of priority, a modern treaty should establish a method for
measuring the interests of the debtor, creditors, and the countries
involved before making a jurisdictional decision. The method
used in the proposed treaty, based solely on the "value of the prop-
erty of the debtor" is too mathematical and inflexible for accept-
ance. On the other hand, the standard preferred by the EU, the
"centre of main interests," is too indeterminate and flexible, and
therefore it is expected to be a constant source of argument and
litigation in the future.8 I would propose a system that places a
premium on the state of incorporation, yet also takes into account
the location of the assets and the location of the creditors. By
including the state of incorporation in the jurisdictional question
one can assure that companies continue to maintain their incorpo-
76. In re Toga Mfg. Ltd., 28 B.R. 165, 170 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1983).
77. Id. at 169.
78. EU REGULATION, supra note 55.
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ration in the NAFTA countries, thus preserving many powers of
corporate control to these countries. The fears of the IRS should
be reduced, as this standard would inhibit a corporation's ability
to incorporate in a foreign country as a means of avoiding Ameri-
can tax laws. 9 However, by having a set formula that also
addressed the location of assets and creditors, it would prevent
companies that, for example, incorporate in the United States, yet
keep all of their operations and activities in Mexico, from arguing
that the main proceeding should be in the United States.
No matter which jurisdictional formula a treaty employs, it
will always be a source of argument and litigation given the grow-
ing complexity of cross-border insolvencies. The only sure way to
avoid these types of arguments is to create harmonized insolvency
laws. While jurisdictional arguments may still result based on
language problems, court resources, and the convenience for debt-
ors or creditors, harmonized substantive laws would eliminate the
forum shopping problems currently found in cross-border insol-
vencies. In the failed U.S.-Canada treaty, the State with jurisdic-
tion had total control of the proceedings and would apply its
insolvency laws to the debtor's entire estate. This placed too much
emphasis on the forum, and would have encouraged the parties to
try and force the proceeding into their favored jurisdiction. In
effect, this provision would have run counter to the overall goal of
the subsequently negotiated NAFTA treaty - to increase cross-bor-
der transactions and free trade.80 Corporations would have been
encouraged to keep their transactions and assets within the bor-
ders of their host country, rather than risk exposure to insolvency
proceedings in another country. With harmonized substantive
laws, these concerns would be eliminated, and corporations would
be encouraged to seek out transactions across all three countries,
in furtherance of the stated goal of NAFTA.
One aspect of the proposed treaty that was commendable was
its overall mission to "provide an equitable, predictable, efficient,
and yet flexible system to administer international bankruptcies
79. As discussed supra at note 69, some believe IRS concerns worked to derail the
proposed treaty. Tax avoidance through re-incorporating in a foreign country is
becoming an increasing problem in the United States, and utilizing incorporation in
this jurisdictional formula may help to curb this practice. See David Clay Johnson,
Vote on an Offshore Tax Plan is Rolling a Company Town, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2002, at
Al (describing the controversy surrounding Stanley Works decision to reincorporate
in Bermuda in order to realize an estimated tax savings of $30 million per year).
80. See NAFTA, supra note 9.
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involving Canada and the United States."81 After a review of the
main provisions of that treaty, it seems clear that they failed in
their achievement of their mission. While it did propose a predict-
able system, the methods it employed did little to promote effi-
ciency, flexibility, or an equitable result. Its goal should, however,
be carried forward and incorporated into a modern treaty amongst
the NAFTA countries.
C. The Tax Treaties in Force Between the NAFTA
Countries
Lessons for an international insolvency treaty can be found by
examining how the United States has utilized treaties to address
international taxation issues. As with other areas of the law, the
United States has increasingly turned towards treaties as the pre-
ferred method for harmonizing tax laws and procedures with for-
eign countries. 2 The American Law Institute recently updated
their treatise on International Aspects of United States Income
Taxation in order to provide practitioners with a "valuable tool for
comprehending the increasingly important role of treaties in deter-
mining the tax consequences of international transactions."" The
numerous tax treaties now in existence have served to harmonize
tax laws, especially in regards to how they operate in cross-border
situations. This harmonization "stems in large part from early
efforts of cooperation ... ."'84 Similar to the current UNCITRAL
Model Law, countries had model tax treaties available to serve as
a springboard for the negotiation of the terms of a tax treaty;
including the 1963 and 1977 OECD Model Law, the 1980 UN
Model, and the 1981 U.S. Model." Furthermore, national tax sys-
tems are just as divergent as national insolvency systems, yet this
has not prevented the successful utilization of treaties on tax
issues. Tax systems can be broken down, based on their main
81. In re Toga Mfg. Ltd., 28 B.R. 165, 169 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1983).
82. As of 1997, the United States was a party to tax treaties with at least eighty-
eight other countries. See generally RICHARD L. DOERNBERG & KEES VAN RAND, U.S.
TAX TREATIES 77 (1997) [hereinafter U.S. TAX TREATIES] (providing a chronological
list of U.S income tax treaties).
83. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, INT'L PRACTICE: ALI INT'L LAW PUBLICATIONS,
OVERVIEW OF INT'L ASPECTS OF U.S. INCOME TAXATION, available at http://www.ali.org/
ali/712.htm (emphasis added). It is interesting to note that the ALI recognizes the
importance of treaties in the field of international tax, but remains unconvinced of
their potential in the field of international insolvency. See text supra note 1.
84. HUGH J. AULT, COMPARATIVE INCOME TAXATION: A STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS 367
(1997) [hereinafter COMPARATIVE INCOME TAXATION).
85. U.S. TAX TREATIES, supra note 82, at Forward.
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characteristics, into several general families: the Commonwealth
systems of countries such as the U.K. and Australia; the Conti-
nental system of countries such as Germany and France; and
more the independent systems of the United States and Japan."
How treaties have overcome these inherent structural differences
can provide guidance for overcoming the differences between the
civil and common law approaches to insolvency. Thus, an exami-
nation of the development of tax treaties from an era of coopera-
tion, based on Model Laws, and overcoming significant structural
differences between the signatory countries, can prove useful for
the development of insolvency treaties from the current atmos-
phere of cooperation and Model Laws.
One important use of treaties in the field of tax is to eliminate
differences in taxation based on the location or nationality of the
taxpayer .8  Due to this goal, "treaty provisions are generally
reciprocal in nature."88 For example, prior to the tax treaty signed
by the United States and Canada, Canadian citizens with prop-
erty in the U.S. faced double taxation at death, whereas U.S. citi-
zens received a deduction for any Canadian tax paid as a claim
against the estate."9 The tax treaty signed by the two countries
served to reduce this divergent treatment, and brought the poli-
cies of each state in closer alignment. The United States has
taken this same approach with many other countries, modifying it
as needed to fit the concerns of a foreign country. Often these
treaties are based significantly on model laws, with the most
important being the OECD Model Law. "All of the countries have
treaties which are based broadly on the OECD Model Conven-
tion."90 In addition, many countries have developed their own
model conventions or treaties, "which set forth the basic positions
that their treaty negotiators will be taking in the opening round of
86. COMPARATIVE INCOME TAXATION, supra note 84, at 1. One treatise describes
the U.S. and the U.K. national tax systems as, "by their nature, incompatible and any
treaty endeavoring to evolve an equitable sharing of the cross-frontier tax burden
becomes even more of a compromise than one between two countries using the same
system." Jerrold Cohen, Ernst & Whinney, UK/US DOUBLE TAX TREATIES GuIDE 1
(1980).
87. Sharon Lorraine Brown, Note, Tax Ramifications of the Third Protocol to the
1980 United States-Canada Income Tax Treaty on United States /Canadian Citizens,
Permanent Resident Aliens, and Non-Resident Aliens Who Engage in Cross-Border
Estate Planning, 21 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 307, 324 (1998).
88. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, INFORMATION ON THE U.S.-CAN. INCOME TAX
TREATY, Intro., Pub. 597 (Rev. May 1998), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/
p597.pdf (last visited May 4, 2002).
89. Brown, supra note 87, at 308-09.
90. COMPARATIVE INCOME TAXATION, supra note 84, at 467.
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treaty discussions."91 In the current insolvency arena, the UNCI-
TRAL Model Law, as well as the TIP, can serve as the springboard
for many of the terms of an insolvency treaty. In addition, during
the negotiation of a treaty with the NAFTA countries, the United
States could develop a model treaty that may later be used in
negotiations with other countries.
On a more detailed level, the United States and Germany
included in their tax treaty, "provisions allowing the parties to
submit unresolved disputes arising from the terms of the conven-
tion to binding arbitration."'92 The inclusion of an arbitration pro-
vision is important because it guarantees that all participants
"have the potential to realize a fair and consistent application of
the terms of the Tax Treaty."93 This is an interesting concept that
could help lend legitimacy to an insolvency treaty. Even if an
insolvency treaty has set substantive law and procedures, dis-
putes may arise through the interpretation of the treaty by one
country's courts. As will be discussed in Part V, an independent
review board comprised of bankruptcy judges from all three coun-
tries could provide an important dispute settlement mechanism.
One area of concern that the tax treaties identify is how the
NAFTA countries would recognize and treat an insolvency treaty
in relation to their domestic legislation. Unlike other areas of the
law, tax treaties do not necessarily supplant domestic legislation
as the supreme law. As one author has explained:
Under constitutional principles in the United States, statu-
tory [tax] law and treaties are of equal status. As a conse-
quence, in the case of conflict between domestic legislation
and treaty provisions, the later in time prevails. Thus, in
principle, treaty obligations can be overridden by later,
inconsistent domestic legislation. 4
While this would appear to limit the effectiveness of a treaty,
by casting doubt upon its certainty and application, there have
been very few pieces of domestic tax legislation that have overrid-
den tax treaty provisions." In addition, this does not seem to have
91. Id. at 476-78 (describing the model treaties of various countries).
92. Paul D. Tutun, Note, Arbitration Procedures in the U.S.-German Income Tax
Treaty: The Need for Procedural Safeguards in Int'l Tax Disputes, 12 B.U. INT'L L.J.
180, 180 (1994).
93. Id.
94. COMPARATIVE INCOME TAXATION, supra note 84, at 467 (noting that courts
require that "legislative intent to override a treaty obligation must be 'clearly
expressed' .....
95. Id.
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caused conflict with Canada's treatment of the tax treaty - where
treaties are put into effect by implementing legislation that "typi-
cally provides that the treaty will prevail over domestic law in the
case of [a] conflict [between the two]."96 In many other countries,
treaty provisions automatically reign supreme over domestic leg-
islation, without the need for implementing legislation. There-
fore, in the drafting of an insolvency treaty, U.S. representatives
should examine the other countries' implementation procedures
and draft appropriate provisions concerning the implementation
of the treaty.
The income tax treaty between the United States and Mexico
is also a good example for an insolvency treaty in a number of
respects. The treaty "provides conditions under which each coun-
try may tax income derived by individual residents of the other
country from independent personal services or as employees
.... "' This treaty was generally based on the "Model Treaty of
the [OECD] and recent income tax conventions of both parties,""8
which presents a similar atmosphere as currently found in the
insolvency legal field. In addition, the treaty encouraged coopera-
tion by "includ[ing] standard administrative provisions which will
permit the tax authorities of the two countries to cooperate to
resolve issues of potential double taxation . ..99 and encouraged
communication by providing that "competent authorities of the
Contracting States may communicate with each other directly for
the purpose of reaching an agreement . ". ..,00 Most importantly,
from an insolvency perspective, the tax convention provided
detailed provisions for use in determining which state the tax-
payer should be considered a resident of for purposes of taxa-
tion.01 In general, a taxpayer is "deemed to be a resident of the
State in which he has a permanent home" or with no permanent
home, the "State with which his personal and economic relations
are closer (center of vital interests)."02 A similar balancing test
contained in an insolvency treaty, as proposed in Part IV B, infra,
would provide the bankruptcy courts with a proper method for
96. Id.
97. Tax Convention with Mexico, Sep. 18, 1992, U.S.-Mex., 1992 U.S.T. LEXIS
193, at letter of submittal from Secretary of State Warren Christopher (May 11,
1993).
98. Id. at letter of transmittal from President William J. Clinton (May 20, 1993).
99. Id. at letter of submittal from Secretary of State Warren Christopher (May 11,
1993).
100. Id. at art. 26, para. 4.
101. Id. at art. 4-5.
102. Id. at art. 4, para. 2(a).
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determining where the primary insolvency proceeding should be
filed.
While income taxation, carried out by governments, is differ-
ent from insolvency proceedings, normally carried out by private
parties, these treaties do provide strong examples of how a cooper-
ative atmosphere, universal model laws, and government leader-
ship can lead to the negotiation and implementation of workable
treaties.
V. THE NEED FOR AN INSOLVENCY TREATY BETWEEN
MEXICO, CANADA, AND THE UNITED STATES
As previously noted, the Model Law, INSOL, and the ALI's
TIP are good first steps in the move towards cooperation in cross-
border insolvencies, however, more needs to be accomplished
within the NAFTA countries. Some would argue that the similari-
ties in the Canadian and U.S. bankruptcy codes, as well as the
increase in cooperation between their courts, forecloses the need
for a bankruptcy treaty between these countries." 3 However,
without a treaty establishing firm guidelines, procedures and har-
monized laws, too much discretion is left in the hands of judges for
determining the level of recognition given to foreign proceedings,
and not enough certainty is given to companies engaged in cross-
border transactions. In addition, Mexico is just as important a
trading partner to the United States as is Canada, and with
NAFTA already in place, an insolvency treaty between those three
countries is a natural next step.
Mexico, as a civil law country, seems to present some obstacle
to the adoption of a treaty with the United States and Canada,
two common law countries." When one looks at the substantive
provisions of the bankruptcy codes of the NAFTA countries, how-
ever, it becomes evident that the differences are not insurmounta-
ble. In addition, these differences present the perfect reason for a
treaty between the NAFTA countries, and help to counter the
argument previously advanced concerning a treaty with Canada.
Mexico's recent adoption of the Model Law into their bankruptcy
103. See Perry, supra note 8, at 499 (questioning that "[p]erhaps the similarities of
law and the emerging trend toward modified universality at customary international
law are sufficient to preclude the necessity of a treaty.").
104. "The fundamental difference [between civil and common law systems] rather,
lies in the powers granted the judiciary for solving disputes, the methods followed by
the courts, and the value and force that the decisions of judges have in subsequent
application and interpretation of a specific law or statute." 2 COLLIER INT'L Bus.
INSOLVENCY, Mex., § 32.02(1) (2000).
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code is an important first step in bringing their laws into accord
with the United States and Canada, and this should signal
responsiveness by their government towards further harmoniza-
tion. Second, as a civil law country, Mexican judges must "strictly
apply the law as written, and must render their decisions... 'pur-
suant to the letter of the law, or the judicial interpretation thereof,
and in its absence, to general legal principles."' 0 5 This makes the
firm guidelines and laws of a treaty all the more important in the
Mexican system. An insolvency treaty would allow the United
States and Canada to help shape the laws that Mexican courts
will follow, and provide a much higher degree of security and pro-
tection for their companies operating in Mexico. Along the same
lines as written laws, "[tihe Mexican legal system is extremely for-
malistic in procedural matters. A case may be won or lost for
exclusively procedural reasons."106 An insolvency treaty could
help to establish the procedures that Mexican companies, as well
as American and Canadian companies, should follow in cross-bor-
der insolvency cases, and thus reduce their risk of a procedural
default and adverse consequences.
There are also many similar provisions in the codes of the
NAFTA countries that could be easily incorporated into the sub-
stantive text of a treaty. One such example is with automatic
stays. All three countries have a version of the automatic stay in
their bankruptcy codes. For example, in Mexico, "upon declara-
tion by the court of a reorganization or a bankruptcy, a stay is
automatically imposed, which forbids the making of payments or
the delivery of goods and property of whatever kind to the bank-
rupt in payment of debts owing to the bankrupt."107 Similarly, in
the United States an "automatic stay gives the bankruptcy court
an opportunity to harmonize the interests of both debtor and cred-
itors while preserving the debtor's assets for repayment and reor-
ganization of his or her obligations."' 8 Both countries view their
automatic stay as extending to all of the debtor's assets world-
wide.' O9 A treaty would allow the NAFTA countries to work-out
105. Id.
106. Id. § 32.03(2).
107. Id. § 32.04(1)(e)(i).
108. In re MacDonald, 755 F.2d 715, 717 (9th Cir. 1985).
109. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, TRANSNATIONAL INSOLVENCY PROJECT: INT'L
STATEMENT OF MEXICAN BANKRUPrcY LAw 51 (Tentative Draft 1998) (stating, "a
moratorium is automatically imposed, which... is deemed to have worldwide effects,
which are therefore subject to recognition by foreign courts."); In re Nakash, 190 B.R.
763, 768 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that for purposes of the automatic stay,
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any differences that did exist in their automatic stay procedures,
and place all three countries on the same playing field, with no
competitive advantage over the other.
One commentator has suggested that a dispute settlement
mechanism could be avoided in the terms of an insolvency treaty
by the inclusion of the dispute mechanism resolution already in
the main NAFTA treaty.' ° Utilizing this supranational dispute
resolution body should, however, be cautioned against, as it has
become problematic in its application in non-insolvency related
matters. Under Chapter 11 of NAFTA, "investor-to-state dispute
resolution allows a private investor to prosecute a case against a
NAFTA government for failure to provide a NAFTA-granted
investor privilege.""' One of the most famous cases arising under
Chapter 11 is the Loewen Group Case, where the company is
suing the Untied States for $725 million as compensation for the
damages they suffered at the hands of a Mississippi jury."2 Suits
such as this have thrown the NAFTA dispute resolution system
into a high level of debate and controversy, and demonstrated the
limitation and complications created by its dispute settlement
mechanism. For these reasons, it is unlikely that it could be
included in an insolvency treaty. Instead, an insolvency treaty
should focus on providing communication and cooperation proce-
dures similar to those contained in the Model Law, and, if there
was a need to create some sort of independent body with limited
review rights, to ensure that it was comprised of judges from each
country.
Despite the previous discussion, NAFTA has been tremen-
dously successful at achieving its main goal of increasing cross-
border transactions and free trade.'13 In the year 2000, in trade
with its NAFTA partners, the United States exported
$288,151,000,000 worth of goods and imported $365,120,000,000
worth of goods. 1 4 As the amount of trade amongst the NAFTA
countries continues to escalate, there is going to be a correspond-
"legislative history makes clear Congress' intent that 'wherever located' language be
broadly construed to include property located inside and outside of the U.S.").
110. Perry, supra note 8, at 498.
111. PUBLIC CITIZEN, NAFTA CHAPTER 11 INVESTOR-TO-STATE CASES: BANKRUPTING
DEMOCRACY 1 (2001).
112. Id. at Executive Summary, iv-v.
113. See Perry, supra note 8.
114. 1996-2000 U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, INT'L TRADE ADMINISTRATION, U.S.
COMMODITY TRADE BY GEOGRAPHIC AREA, NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
(Canada + Mexico) (last updated Jan. 24, 2002), at http://www.geocities.coml
Pentagon13076/ (last visited May 10, 2002).
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ing increase in the amount of cross-border insolvencies involving
the legal systems of all three countries. By taking firm steps
towards the creation of an insolvency treaty, the governments of
the NAFTA countries can prevent future disputes, protect the
interests of their domestic companies, and further the increased
level of cooperation and trade that has developed since the signing
of the main NAFTA treaty.
VI. CONCLUSION
Cross-border insolvencies are already reaching record levels,
both in terms of the size of the company involved and the number
of different jurisdictions involved. Current national insolvency
laws are ill-equipped for dealing with cross-border situations and
national bankruptcy courts are in danger of becoming over-
whelmed by their growing caseloads and increasing interaction
with cross-border situations. Bankruptcy law is too important for
"reform [to] be left to a few academics and insolvency practition-
ers,"115 and firm guidance from national governments is now
required. The governments of Mexico, Canada, and the United
States need to bring their bankruptcy laws back in symmetry with
the bankruptcy market, and the most effective means for accom-
plishing that is through an international insolvency treaty.
115. Boshkoff, supra note 5, at 935.
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